Having premised these things, I shall, with the aid of my judgment and information, which I confess are not extensive, go into the discussion of this system more minutely. Is it necessary for your liberty that you should abandon those great rights by the adoption of this system? Is the relinquishment of the trial by jury and the liberty of the press neck for your liberty? Will the abandonment of your most sacred rights tend to the security of your liberty? Liberty, the greatest of all earthly blessing- give us that precious and you may take every thing else] But I am fearful have lived long enough to become an old-fashioned fellow. Perhaps an invincible attachment to the dearest rights of man may, in these refined, enlightened days, be deemed old-fashioned if so, I am contented to be so. I say the time has been when every pore of my heart beat for American liberty, and which, I believe, had a counterpart in the breast of every true American; but suspicions have gone forth--suspicions of my integrity- publicly reported that my professions are not real.

Twenty-three years ago was I supposed a traitor to my country. I was then said to be a bane of sedition, because I supported the rights of my country. I may be thought suspicious when I say our privileges and rights are in danger. But, sir, a number of the people of this country are weak enough to think these things are too true. I am happy to find that the honorable gentleman on the other side declares they are groundless. But, sir, suspicion is a virtue as long as its object is the preservation of the public good, and as long as it stays within proper bounds. Should it fall on me, I am contented. Conscious rectitude is a powerful consolation. I trust there are many who think my professions for the public good to be real. Let your suspicion look to both sides. There are many on the other side who possibly may have been persuaded of the necessity of these measures, which I conceive to be dangerous to your liberty. Guard with jealous attention the public liberty. Suspect every one who approaches that jewel. Unfortunately, nothing will preserve it but downright force. Whenever you give up that force you are inevitably ruined I am answered by gentlemen that, though I might speak of terrors, yet the fact was that we were surrounded by none of the dangers I apprehended. I conceive this new government to be one of those dangers : it has produced those horrors which distress many of our best citizens. We are come hither to preserve the poor Commonwealth of Virginia, if it can be possibly done: something must be done to preserve your liberty and mine. The Confederation, this same despised government, merits, in my opinion, the highest encomium. It carried us through a long and dangerous war it rendered us victorious in that bloody conflict with a powerful nation; it has secured us a territory greater than any European monarch possesses and shall a government which has been thus strong and vigorous, be accused of imbecility, and abandoned for want of energy? Consider what you are about to do before you part with this government. Take longer time in reckoning things revolutions like this have happened in almost every country in Europe; similar examples are to be found in ancient Greece and ancient Rome--instances of the people losing their liberty by their own carelessness, and the ambition of a few. We are cautioned by the honorable gentleman who presides against faction and turbulence. I acknowledge that licentiousness is dangerous, and that it ought to be provided against: I acknowledge, also, the new form of government may effectually prevent it: yet there is another thing it will as effectually do, it will oppress and ruin the people. There are sufficient guards placed against sedition and licentiousness for, when power is given to this government to suppress these, or for any other purpose, the language it assumes is clear, express, and unequivocal; but when this Constitution speaks of privileges. There is an ambiguity, sir, a fatal ambiguity-an ambiguity which is very astonishing. In the clause under consideration there is the strangest language that I can conceive. I mean, when it says that there shall not be more representatives than one for every thirty thousand. Now, sir, how easy is it to evade this privilege! 'The number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand.' This may be satisfied by one representative from each State. Let our numbers be ever so great, this immense continent may, by this artful expression, be reduced to have but thirteen representatives. I confess this construction is not natural; but the ambiguity of the expression lays a good ground for a quarrel. Why was it not clearly and unequivocally expressed that they should be entitled to have one for every thirty thousand? This would have obviated all disputes and was this difficult to be done? What is the inference? When population increases, and a State shall send representatives in this proportion, Congress may remand them, because the right of having one for every thirty thousand is not clearly expressed. This possibility of reducing the number to one for each state approximates to probability by that other expression--'but each State shall at least have one representative.' Now, is it not clear that, from the first expression, the number might be reduced so much that some States should have no representatives at all, were it not for the insertion of this last expression? And as this is the only restriction upon them, we may fairly conclude that they may restrain the number to one from each State. Perhaps the same horrors may hang over my mind again. I shall be told I am continually afraid: but, sir, I have strong cause of apprehension. . . .

The honorable gentleman said that great danger would ensue if the Convention rose without adopting this system. I ask, where is that danger? I see none. Other gentlemen have told us within these walls, that the Union is gone, or that the Union will be gone. Is not this trifling with the judgment of their fellow- citizens? Till they tell us the ground of their fears I will consider them as imaginary. I rose to make inquiry where those dangers were; they could make no answer: I believe I never shall have that answer. Is there a disposition in the people of this country to revolt against the dominion of lays? Has there been a single tumult in Virginia? Have not the people of Virginia, when laboring under the severest pressure of accumulated distresses, manifested the most cordial acquiescence in the execution of the laws? What could be more awful than their unanimous acquiescence under general distresses? Is there any revolution in Virginia? Whither is the spirit of America gone? Whither is the genius of America fled? It was but yesterday, when our enemies marched in triumph through our country. Yet the people of this country could not be appalled by their pompous armaments. They stopped their career and victoriously captured them. Where is the peril, now, compared to that? Some minds are agitated by foreign alarms. Happily for us, there is no real danger from Europe; that country is engaged in more arduous business. From that quarter there is no cause of fear; you may sleep in safety for ever for them. Where is the danger? If, sir, there was any, I would recur to the American spirit to defend us that spirit which has enabled us to surmount the greatest difficulties. To that illustrious spirit I address my most fervent prayer to prevent our adopting a system destructive to liberty. Let not gentlemen be told that it is not safe to reject this government. Wherefore is it not safe? We are told there are dangers, but those dangers are ideal they cannot be demonstrated. To encourage us to adopt it, they tell us that there is a plain, easy way of getting amendments. When I come to contemplate this part, I suppose that I am mad, or that my countrymen are so. The way to amendment is, in my conception, shut. Let us consider this plain, easy way.

Hence it appears that three fourths of the States must ultimately agree to any amendments that may be necessary. Let us consider the consequence of this. However uncharitable it may appear, yet I must tell my opinion-that the most unworthy characters may get into power and prevent the introduction of amendments. Let us suppose--for the case is supposable, possible, and probable--that you happen to deal those powers to unworthy hands; will they relinquish powers already in their possession, or agree to amendments? Two thirds of the Congress, or of the State legislatures, are necessary even to propose amendments. If one third of these be unworthy men, they may prevent the application for amendments but what is destructive and mischievous is that three fourths of the State legislatures, or of the State conventions, must concur in the amendments when proposed! In such numerous bodies there must necessarily be some designing, bad men. To suppose that so large a number as three fourths of the States will concur is to suppose that they will possess genius, intelligence, and integrity, approaching to miraculous. It would, indeed, be miraculous that they should concur in the same amendments, or even in such as would bear some likeness to one another; for four of the smallest States, that do not collectively contain one tenth part of the population of the United States, may obstruct the most salutary and necessary amendments. Nay, in these four States, six tenths of the people may reject these amendments and suppose that amendments shall be opposed to amendments, which is highly probable--is it possible that three fourths can ever agree to the same amendments? A bare majority in these four small States may hinder the adoption of amendments; so that we may fairly and justly conclude that one twentieth part of the American people may prevent the removal of the most grievous inconveniences and oppression, by refusing to accede to amendments. A trifling minority may reject the most salutary amendments. Is this an easy mode of securing the public liberty? It is, sir, a most fearful situation. Then the most contemptible minority can prevent the alteration of the most oppressive government for it may in many respects prove to be such. Is this the spirit of republicanism?

What, sir, is the genius of democracy? Let me read that clause of the Bill of Rights of Virginia which relates to this:...

This, sir, is the language of democracy--that a majority of the community have a right to alter their government when found to be oppressive. But how different is the genius of your new Constitution from this! How different from the sentiments of freemen, that a contemptible minority can prevent the good of the majority. If, then, gentlemen, standing on this ground, are come to that point that they are willing to bind themselves and their posterity to be oppressed. I am amazed and inexpressibly astonished- If this be the opinion of the majority. I must submit but to me, sir, it appears perilous and destructive. I cannot help thinking so. Perhaps it may be the result of my age. These may be feelings natural to a man of my years, when the American spirit has left him, and his mental powers, like the members of the--body, are decayed. If, sir, amendments are left to the twentieth, or the tenth part of the people of America, your liberty is gone forever. We have heard that there is a great deal of bribery practised in the House of Commons in England, and that many of the members raise themselves to preferments by selling the rights of the people. But, sir, the tenth part of that body cannot continue oppressions on the rest of the people. English liberty is, in this case, on a firmer foundation than American liberty. It will be easily contrived to procure the, opposition of one tenth of the people to any alteration, however judicious. The honorable gentleman who presides told us that, to prevent abuses in our government, we will assemble in Convention, recall our delegated powers, and punish our servants for abusing the trust reposed in them. 0 sir, we should have fine times indeed, if to punish tyrants it were only sufficient to assemble the people! Your arms, wherewith you could defend yourselves, are gone and you have no longer an aristocratical, no longer a democratical spirit. Did you ever read of any revolution in any nation, brought about by the punishment of those in power, inflicted by those who had no power at all? You read of a Riot Act in a country which is called one of the freest in the world, where a few neighbors cannot assemble without the risk of being shot by a hired soldiery, the engines of despotism. We may see such an Act in America. A standing army we shall have, also, to execute the execrable commands of tyranny; and how are you to punish them? Will you order them to be punished? Who shall obey these orders ? Will your mace-bearer be a match for a disciplined regiment ? In what situation are we to be? The clause before you gives a power of direct taxation, unbounded and unlimited, exclusive power of legislation. in all cases whatsoever, for ten miles square, and over all places purchased for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, etc. What resistance could be made? The attempt would be madness. You will find all the strength of this country in the hands of your enemies those garrisons will naturally be the strongest places in the country. Your militia is given up to Congress, also in another part of this plan they will therefore act as they think proper: all power will be in their own possession. You cannot force them to receive their punishment. Of what service would militia be to you, when, most probably, you will not have a single musket in the State? For, as arms are to be provided by Congress, they may or may not furnish them.

Let me here call your attention to that part which gives the Congress power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United State reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress'. By this, sir, you see that their control over our last and best defence is unlimited. If they neglect or refuse to discipline or arm our militia, they will be useless. The States can do neither--this power being exclusively given to Congress. The power of appointing officers over men not disciplined or armed is ridiculous; so that this pretended little remains of power left to the States may, at the pleasure of Congress, be rendered nugatory. Our situation will be deplorable indeed: nor can we ever expect to get this government amended, since I have already shown that a very small minority may prevent it, and that small minority interested in the continuance of the oppression. Will the oppressor let go the oppressed! Was there ever an instance? Can the annals of mankind exhibit one single example where rulers overcharged with power willingly let go the oppressed, though solicited and requested most earnestly? The application for amendments will there fore be fruitless. Sometimes the oppressed have got loose by one of those bloody struggles that desolate a country; but a willing relinquishment of power is one of those things which human nature never was, nor ever will be, capable of.

Shall we imitate the example of those nations who have gone from a simple to a splendid government? Are those nations more worthy of our imitation ? What can make an adequate satisfaction to them for the loss they suffered in attaining such a government for the loss of their liberty? If we admit this consolidated government, it will be because we like a great, splendid one. Some way or other we must be a great and mighty empire; we must have an army and a navy, and a number of things. When the American spirit was in its youth, the language of America was different: liberty, sir, was then the primary object. We are descended from a people whose government was founded on liberty: our glorious forefathers of Great Britain made liberty the foundation of everything. That country is become a great, mighty, and splendid nation; not because their government is strong and energetic, but, sir, because liberty is its direct end and foundation. We drew the spirit of liberty from our British ancestors: by that spirit we have triumphed over every difficulty. But now, sir, the American spirit, assisted by the ropes and chains of consolidation, is about to convert this country into a powerful and mighty empire. If you make the citizens of this country agree to become the subjects of one great consolidated empire of America, your government will not have sufficient energy to keep them together. Such a government is incompatible with the genius of republicanism. There will be no checks, no real balances, in this government. What can avail your specious, imaginary balances, your rope-dancing, chain- rattling, ridiculous ideal checks and contrivances? But, sir, we are not feared by foreigners; we do not make nations tremble. Would this, sir, constitute happiness, or secure liberty? I trust, sir, our political hemisphere will ever direct their operations to the security of those objects. Consider our situation, sir. Go to the poor man and ask him what he does. He will inform you that he enjoys the fruits of his labor, under his own fig-tree, with his wife and children around him, in peace and security. Go to every other member of society-you will find the same tranquil ease and content; you will find no alarms or disturbances. Why, then, tell us of dangers, to terrify us into an adoption of this new government? And yet who knows the dangers that this new system may produce? They are out of the sight of the common people: they cannot foresee latent consequences. I dread the operation of it on the middling and lower class of people: it is for them I fear the adoption of this system....

The next clause of the [Virginian] Bill of Rights tells you, 'that all power of suspending law, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without the consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised.' This tells us that there can be no suspension of government or laws without our own consent; yet this Constitution can counteract and suspend any of our laws that contravene its oppressive operation; for they have the power of direct taxation, which suspends our Bills of Rights; and it is expressly provided that they can make all laws necessary for carrying their powers into execution; and it declared paramount to the laws and Constitutions of the State Consider how the only remaining defence we have left is destroyed in this manner. Besides the expenses of maintaining the Senate and other House in as much splendor as they please, there is to be a great and mighty President, with very extensive powers--the powers of a king. He is to be supported in extravagant magnificence; so that the whole of our property may be taken by this American government, by laying what taxes they please, giving themselves what salaries they please, and suspending our laws at their pleasure. I might be thought too inquisitive, but I believe I should take up but very little of your time in enumerating the little power that is left to the government of Virginia; for this power is reduced to little or nothing: their garrisons, magazines, arsenals, and forts, which will be situated in the strongest places within the States; their ten miles square, with all the fine ornaments of human life, added to their powers, and taken from the States, will reduce the power of the latter to nothing, ...

This Constitution is said to have beautiful features; but when I come to examine these features, sir, they appear to me horribly frightful. Among other deformities, it has an awful squinting. It squints towards monarchy; and does not this raise indignation in the breast of every true American ? Your President may easily become King. Your Senate is so imperfectly constructed that your dearest rights may be sacrificed by what may be a small minority; and a very small minority may continue forever unchangeably this government, although horridly defective. Where are your checks in this government? Your strongholds will be in the hands of your enemies. It is on a supposition that our American governors shall be honest, that all the good qualities of this government are founded; but its defective and imperfect construction puts it in their power to perpetrate the worst of mischiefs, should they be bad men; and, sir, would not all the world, from the eastern to the western hemisphere, blame our distracted folly in resting our rights upon the contingency of our rulers being good or bad? Show me that age and country where the rights and liberties of the people were placed on the sole chance of their rulers being good men, without a consequent loss of liberty ! I say that the loss of that dearest privilege has ever followed, with absolute certainty, every such mad attempt. If your American chief be a man of ambition and abilities, how easy is it for him to render himself absolute! The army is in his hands, and if he be a man of address, it will be attached to him, and it will be the subject of long meditation with him to seize the first auspicious moment to accomplish his design; and, sir, will the American spirit solely relieve you when this happens? I would rather infinitely-and I am sure most of this Convention are of the same opinion-have a King, Lords, and Commons, than a, government so replete with such insupportable evils. If we make a King, we may prescribe the rules by which he shall rule his people, and interpose such checks as shall prevent him from infringing them; but the President, in the field, at the head of his army, can prescribe the terms on which be shall reign master, so far that it will pee any American ever to get his neck from under the galling yoke. I cannot with patience think of this idea If ever he violates the laws, one of two things will happen: he shall come at the head of his army, to carry everything before him; or he will give ball, or do what Mr. Chief Justice will order him. If he be guilty, will not the recollection of his crimes teach him to make one bold push for the American throne? Will not the immense difference between being master of everything, and being ignominiously tried and punished, powerfully excite him to make this bold push? But, sir, where is the existing force to punish him ? Can he not, at the-head of his army, beat down every opposition? Away with your President! we shall have a King! The army will salute him monarch: your militia will leave you, and assist in making him King, and fight against you: and what have you to oppose the force? What will then become of you and your rights? Will not absolute despotism ensue [Here Mr. HENRY strongly and pathetically expatiated on the probability of the President's enslaving America, and the horrid consequences that must result.]